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81 
OHIO’S BROWNFIELD PROBLEM AND POSSIBLE 
SOLUTIONS: WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR A 
SUCCESSFUL BROWNFIELD INITIATIVE? 
“[W]e are entering an ‘Age of Possibility’— with vast new 
opportunities . . . .  The Brownfields Initiative, . . . is bringing new 
development, new jobs, and new hope to communities - while 
engaging citizens and showing that environmental protection and 
economic development can go hand-in-hand.”1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In response to the environmental disaster at Love Canal,2 Congress 
                                                          
 1. Vice President Al Gore, Preface to TODD S. DAVIS & KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, 
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, at xix, 
xix (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) (discussing the Clinton Administration’s 
Brownfields Economic Redevelopment Initiative).  “Brownfield” is defined by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency as “abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and commercial 
facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated by real or perceived environmental 
contamination.”  See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 2. Wendy E. Wagner, Overview of Federal and State Law Governing Brownfields Cleanups, 
in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 15, 15 
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).  What has become known as the Love Canal 
disaster began innocently enough over a century ago.  In the 1890’s William Love built a canal off 
of the Niagara River in New York in order to generate electric power. ADELINE GORDON LEVINE, 
LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 9 (1982).  The abundance of electricity attracted 
chemical manufacturing plants to the area.  Id.  However, political forces and the discovery of other 
means of generating electricity doomed the canal project.  Id.  In 1942, Niagara County gave the 
Hooker Electrochemical Company permission to use the abandoned canal as a receptacle for 
chemical waste.  Id. at 10.  For the next ten years, Hooker continued to dump chemical waste into 
the canal until most of the canal was full.  Id. at 11.  The canal was then capped with clay and earth.  
Id.  In 1953, Hooker deeded the land encompassing the canal to the Niagara Falls School District for 
one dollar.  Id.  The deed contained a disclaimer in which Hooker disclaimed all liability that might 
result from injury or death caused by the presence of industrial contaminates.  Id.  An elementary 
school and a surrounding residential neighborhood were built on the site.  Id. at 7.  Over time the 
clay encapsulating the canal began to deteriorate allowing chemicals to seep and pool on the surface 
and leak into the basements of nearby homes.  Id. at 12-15.  The US EPA tested the air in residents’ 
basements and the soil and water in the area.  Id. at 19-20.  The tests uncovered chemicals that were 
known to be carcinogenic.  Id. at 41.  Studies also noted an increased incidence of miscarriages and 
birth defects among the residents closest to the canal.  Id. at 92-93.  Although the results of the tests 
were alarming, “[c]orrective measures were undertaken at a creeping pace.”  Id. at 20.  Residents 
who were informed that their basements and homes posed health risks were unable to move because 
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passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980.3  The intent of this legislation is to 
encourage private parties to voluntarily pursue remediation of 
contaminated industrial sites, and to provide government reimbursement 
for environmental cleanup when private parties have not taken action.4  
Unfortunately, due to the broad strict liability that CERCLA imposes,5 
CERCLA has had the unintended counter-effect of stifling brownfield 
cleanup and redevelopment.6  Therefore, many states7 have created 
voluntary cleanup programs and funding assistance programs as 
catalysts to brownfield remediation and urban redevelopment.8 
Recently, Ohio Governor Bob Taft proposed, and the Ohio 
legislature approved, a ballot measure to further brownfield 
                                                          
there were no buyers for their contaminated homes.  Id. at 22.  All of the involved governmental 
entities and the Hooker Company denied any responsibility.  Id. at 25.  Eventually after great public 
outcry from the Love Canal residents and extensive media coverage, the federal government 
appropriated $20 million to relocate the Love Canal residents.  Id. at 213. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988). 
 4. American Color & Chem. Corp. v. Tenneco Polymers, Inc., 918 F. Supp. 945, 955 
(D.S.C. 1995), citing General Elec. v. Litton Bus. Sys. Inc., 715 F.Supp. 949, 961-62 (W.D. Mo. 
1989), aff’d, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) and Con-Tech Sales Defined Benefit Trust v. 
Cockerham, 1991 WL 209791, at *4 (E.D. Pa. 1991).  American Color involved a recovery action 
by American Color & Chemical Corp., the current owner of the property, against Tenneco, the past 
owner.  Tenneco counter-claimed.  The court justified its finding that both parties where liable for 
the cleanup costs by looking at the purpose of CERCLA.  918 F. Supp. at 955. 
 5. Strict liability is liability that is assessed regardless of fault.  Christine Kolody Carver, 
Note, Brownfields Blues, 22 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 241, 245-46 (1997).  Strict liability is usually 
reserved for activities that are inherently dangerous, therefore CERCLA’s strict liability provision 
as applied to innocent owners is misplaced and unfair. Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and 
the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. 
REV. 285, 294-95 (1995). 
 6. See DANIEL RIESEL, ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 13.05 
(2000).  The liability scheme imposed by CERCLA actually “encourages businesses to avoid 
liability rather than take steps to clean up the waste.”  Solo, supra note 5, at 304.  Current property 
owners who have reason to believe contamination may be presently on their property are reluctant 
to market the property for fear that in doing so the contamination will be discovered and they will 
expose themselves to environmental liability.  Brian C. Walsh, Statute, Seeding the Brownfields: A 
Proposed Statute Limiting Environmental Liability for Prospective Purchasers, 34 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 191, 202-03 (1997). 
 7. As of 1998, only North Dakota and South Dakota were without some form of state 
Voluntary Cleanup Program.  See generally CHARLES BARTSCH & CHRISTINE ANDERSON, 
BROWNFIELDS “STATE OF THE STATES”: A MID-YEAR REVIEW OF INITIATIVES AND PROGRAM 
IMPACTS (1998) [hereinafter STATE OF THE STATES]. 
 8. E.g. Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields Programs 
Can’t Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1075, 1077 (1999).  But see, Joel B. Eisen,  Brownfields of Dreams’?: Challenges and Limits 
of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 883, 888 (suggesting that 
state cleanup statutes are “being oversold as a panacea of urban redevelopment”). 
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redevelopment efforts in Ohio.9  The Ohio voters subsequently 
supported Issue One in the November 2000 general election.10  Issue 
One will provide $200 million through the issuance of bonds for 
brownfield cleanup and redevelopment throughout the state of Ohio.11  
Although Ohio would certainly benefit if current brownfields are 
cleaned and made productive again,12 Issue One has met with some 
opposition due in part to its lack of specifics.13  A state’s plan for 
brownfield redevelopment must be detailed, comprehensive, and well 
thought out in order to properly address the myriad of complex issues14 
                                                          
 9. E.g. Randy Ludlow, Brownfield Bonds Proposed, CINCINNATI POST, Mar. 31, 2000, at 
16A.  The issue is to be funded without the aid of tax increases.  Id.  Bonds would be issued to raise 
the initial funds, and the interest on the bonds will “be paid over 15 years with existing funds and 
state liquor profits.” Id. 
 10. Ken Alltucker, Ohio’s Issue 1 Fund Applicants get in Line; Region Hopes to Get Share of 
Brownfield Repair Money, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Nov. 14, 2000, at B10. 
 11. James Bradshaw & Randall Edwards, Measure Aimed at Cleaning Up Sites $400 Million 
Bond Package, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Mar. 16, 2000, at 01D.  The $200 million brownfield bond 
issue is being placed on the ballot with a $200 million conservation program.  Id.  Conservationists 
who oppose the brownfield issue are placed in a difficult position because both proposals are 
combined as one issue.  Randall Edwards, Taft to PiggyBack Bond Issues Activists Torn Between 
Cleanups and Conservation, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2000, at 01A [hereinafter Edwards, Taft 
to Piggyback]. 
 12. In 1992 thirty-seven percent of the nation’s Superfund sites were located in the Great 
Lakes region due to the high concentration of former manufacturing sites.  Daniel Michel, 
Comment, The CERCLA Paradox and Ohio’s Response to the Brownfield Problem: Senate Bill 221, 
26 U. TOL. L. REV. 435, 436 (1995).  In the Cleveland, Ohio area alone, it is estimated that there are 
over 6000 contaminated brownfield sites.  Robertson, supra note 8, at n.20. 
 13. Joel Moroney, Wording a Bit Dim for Issue on Ballot, AKRON BEACON J., Aug. 18, 2000, 
at F3 (noting that the ballot language is confusing, and vague); Laura Yeomans, Issue 1 Deserves a 
‘No’ From Voters, AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 7, 2000, at A11 (“The language of Issue 1 is so weak 
that the loopholes will allow the money to be spent in a variety of ways to bail out polluters.”); 
Editorial, The State of the State, CINCINNATI POST, Jan. 24, 2000, at 18A (“[I]t’s not at all clear at 
first blush that Taft’s proposals are adequate”); Randall Edwards, Environmentalists Hail Taft’s 
Proposal State of the State, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Jan. 20, 2000, at 9A (stating that Governor Taft 
has “a wonderful idea”, but that he must provide more detail in order to gain support for the issue).  
The pertinent language of Issue One states that the revitalization encompasses,  “providing for and 
enabling the environmentally safe and productive development and use or reuse of publicly and 
privately owned lands, including those within urban areas, by the remediation or clean up of 
contamination; and addressing by clearance, land acquisition or otherwise, contamination or other 
property conditions or circumstances that might be deleterious to the public health and safety and 
the environment and water and other natural resources, or that preclude or inhibit environmentally 
sound or economic use of the property.”  1999 OH. Ballot Measure No. 2 HJR 15 (ballot measure to 
amend the state constitution to authorize the issuance of bonds for environmental remediation and 
conservation). 
 14. In addition to the confusion caused by the numerous statutes that apply to brownfield 
redevelopment, much of the complexity stems from “the large number of professional disciplines 
necessary to tackle brownfields projects, as well as the lack of detailed information readily available 
about newly emerging state and federal programs.”  TODD S. DAVIS & KEVIN D. MARGOLIS, 
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surrounding brownfields. 
This Comment intends to survey the current state of Ohio’s 
brownfield redevelopment programs.  It also examines the successes and 
failures of other states’ brownfield redevelopment efforts in order to 
uncover the elements of success common to a comprehensive brownfield 
redevelopment plan.  Part II discusses the environmental, economic, and 
social problems that are associated with brownfield sites.  Part III 
examines the impediments to brownfield redevelopment.  Part IV 
illuminates the federal government’s efforts aimed at the brownfield 
problem.  Part V provides an overview of Ohio’s current brownfield 
redevelopment programs.  Part VI discusses the ingredients of a 
successful state brownfield redevelopment initiative through the 
examination of successful brownfield redevelopment programs in 
existence.  This Comment suggests that a comprehensive brownfield 
redevelopment plan includes: releases from liability, structured standards 
and controls regarding cleanup, funding and financing assistance, and 
community participation. 
II.  PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH BROWNFIELDS 
A.  Contaminated Hazardous Land 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency defines 
“brownfields” as “abandoned, idled, or under-used industrial and 
commercial facilities where expansion or redevelopment is complicated 
by real or perceived environmental contamination.”15  The degree of 
                                                          
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY xxi 
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).  Brownfield redevelopment entails many 
disciplines and “requires extensive knowledge of the law, environmental assessment and 
remediation, finance, real estate, insurance, and economic development.”  Todd S. Davis & Kevin 
D. Margolis, Defining the Brownfields Problem, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 4 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) 
[hereinafter Defining the Brownfields Problem]. 
 15. Gabriel A. Espinosa, Building on Brownfields: A Catalyst for Neighborhood 
Revitalization, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 8 (1990), citing Office of Solid Waste and Emergency 
Response, Environmental Protection Agency, Brownfields National Partnership Action Agenda 
(May 1997).  Although the Environmental Protection Agency’s definition is generally accepted, 
multiple definitions of “brownfields” exist.  Eisen, supra note 8, at 890 & n.20.  For example, the 
United States Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) has enlarged the definition to include 
property “whose redevelopment may be hindered not only by potential contamination, but also by 
poor location, old or obsolete infrastructure, or other less tangible factors often linked to 
neighborhood decline.”  Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 5, citing U.S. OTA, 
STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS: PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF 
4
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harm posed by a brownfield site can vary greatly, because brownfields 
can encompass sites ranging from those that are severely contaminated 
to those with little or no actual contamination.16  A minority of the 
nation’s brownfields17 are contaminated at levels high enough to be 
considered for inclusion on the National Priorities List (NPL), but many 
are still candidates for action under CERCLA.18  Brownfield sites can 
include prior uses such as dry cleaners, manufacturing facilities, gas 
stations, factories and plants, and even office buildings.19  If 
contamination is present, the hazards can include groundwater 
contamination and health risks for the local residents.20  Sweeping 
environmental liability laws, which cause property to be kept off the 
market, magnify the problem by hindering the detection of contaminated 
sites.21  If contaminated sites are not detected, potential health hazards 
will not be addressed.22  Even if the land has no serious contamination, 
the abandoned site fosters further environmental threats such as 
unauthorized dumping.23 
In addition to the environmental concerns, abandoned industrial 
                                                          
CONTAMINATED SITES 8 (1995). 
 16. See Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 5-6 (noting that actually 
uncontaminated property “may suffer from the ‘brownfields stigma’ until a site assessment proves 
the property is clean”). 
 17. The Government Affairs Office has estimated that there are 450,000 brownfields 
nationwide.  DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 565 (1999); Walsh, 
supra note 6, at 198. 
 18. Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 7.  The National Priorities List (NPL) 
identifies the nation’s most seriously contaminated sites under CERCLA, earmarking these sites for 
priority cleanup and federal funds.  Id.  The sites listed on the NPL are known as Superfund sites.  
CHARLES BARTSCH & ELIZABETH COLLATON, Preface to BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTIES vii (1997) [hereinafter BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING].  
Only approximately 1250 sites have been singled out under CERCLA to be placed on the NPL.  
Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 7. 
 19. John Chihak et al., Developing Brownfields, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 254, 255 
(1997); Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 5.  See also BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING 
AND REUSING, supra note 8, at vii. (noting that brownfields can include steel and timber mills, 
mining facilities, machine shops, and chemical plants).  Even an unassuming former office building 
can be a contaminated site, as many older buildings have insulation and tile made of asbestos, and 
lead paint, which have since been discovered to be harmful.  See id. at 4.  Because of these 
contaminants these building cannot even be demolished without considerable cost.  Id. 
 20. Eisen, supra note 8, at 895. 
 21. Walsh, supra note 6, at 202-03.  Property owners are unlikely to place their property on 
the market and risk detection of contamination by the purchaser who may then sue for the cost of 
cleanup.  Id.  See also Robertson, supra note 8, at 1078.  Because the cost of remediation could far 
exceed the value of the property, owners would rather lose the resale value of the land than subject 
themselves to potential liability.  Chihak, supra note 19, at 256-57. 
 22. Chihak, supra note 19, at  257. 
 23. Eisen, supra note 8, at 895. 
5
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sites pose other hazards to a community.  For instance, an empty facility 
encourages loitering and poses a potential risk of fire.24 Curious children 
are drawn to such sites, unaware of the danger these sites pose.25  
Moreover, “vacant properties contribute to high crime rates and the 
deterioration of urban neighborhoods.”26  Lastly, if left unattended, the 
“pollution may worsen or spread” creating even greater environmental 
and health risks.27 
B.  Urban Sprawl 
Most brownfield sites are located within urban areas.28  When an 
industry closes its doors, or is lured to a suburban greenfield29 site, it 
takes with it employment opportunities and taxes and leaves behind a 
potentially contaminated site.30  As the jobs move out of the inner city, 
residents are left “chronically unemployed.”31  If the site was returned to 
                                                          
 24. “Vacant facilities deteriorate and invite abuse, including the unsupervised stripping of 
parts or material, vandalism or arson, and ‘midnight’ dumping.”  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND 
REUSING, supra note 18, at 2. 
 25. Eisen, supra note 8 at n.41, citing National Envtl. Pol’y Inst., Beyond Brownfields: Idle 
Land, Suburban Sprawl, and the Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE REINVENTING URBAN 
ENVIRONMENTALISM: BROWNFIELDS POLICY FORUM, at 6 (1995). 
 26. Eisen, supra note 8, at 895.  Brownfields are “conspicuous symbols of the decline . . . 
[that] discourage urban investment and contribute to a pervasive sense of poverty and 
hopelessness.”  Id. 
 27. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 2.  If hazardous materials are 
left in barrels buried beneath the earth to rust, contamination may become even more severe.  See id. 
at 14-15. 
 28. E.g. Terry J. Tondro, Reclaiming Brownfields to Save Greenfields: Shifting the 
Environmental Risks of Acquiring and Reusing Contaminated Land, 27 CONN. L. REV. 789, 790 
(1995). 
 29. A “Greenfield” is “land that has never been used for manufacturing or commercial 
activities and which carries with it none of the potential for environmental liability of a 
Brownfield.”  Id. at 791. 
 30. Businesses currently located in urban areas have found that it is less costly to move the 
entire company’s operations to a greenfield site than it is to expand their current facility in the city.  
Scott D. Garson, Rebuilding Communities through Brownfields Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS: 
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 177 (Todd S. Davis & 
Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).  In particular, one Cleveland, Ohio company determined that it 
would cost $1.2 million more to develop adjacent brownfield property in the city than it would be 
move the existing operation and expand in a suburban location.  Id. at 179. 
 31. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1078.  Higher unemployment rates caused by the lack of 
industry plague the poor and minorities who are financially unable to “escape . . . to the suburbs.”  
Glen M. Vogel, An Examination of Two of New York State’s Brownfields Remediation Initiatives: 
Title V of the 1996 Bond Act and the Voluntary Remediation Program, 17 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 83, 
88-89 (1999).  Lower income inner city residents are trapped by their dependence on  public 
transportation.  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 3.  Some see brownfield 
redevelopment as the “means to obtain much-needed job development and training for dislocated 
6
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“productive use [it] could create jobs, generate tax revenues, and raise 
the economic outlook for urban residents.”32 
Although the Superfund Act and similar legislation did not cause 
urban sprawl, this legislation has exasperated the problem and has 
limited the ability of local government to redevelop and revitalize urban 
areas.33  In order for redevelopment to take place “the climate must be 
conducive to investment.”34  Due to potential cleanup liability, extensive 
delays,35 and financing hurdles, developers are less apt to consider 
redeveloping the abandoned site in favor of a greenfield site.36  With 
uncertain liability looming over development on a brownfield site, cities 
are unable to attract industry back into the urban core.37 
Urban sprawl hastens the deterioration of cities, leaving a mature 
infrastructure in place.38  As industry and jobs move to unspoiled 
greenlands, new infrastructure39 must be put in place, while the existing 
infrastructure goes to waste.40  Federally provided funds are used to 
                                                          
workers and minority populations” who live in the cities.  Id. at ix. 
 32. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1079.  However, even some sites that have been cleaned have 
not been sold or returned to productive use.  Solo, supra note 5, at 302-03.  These sites are left 
fallow because the owners fear future liability from contamination that might not have been 
detected when the site was assessed.  Id. 
 33. Garson, supra note 30, at 179; Solo, supra note 5, at 301.  See also Andrea Wortzel, 
Comment, Greening the Inner Cities: Can Federal Tax Incentives Solve the Brownfields Problem?, 
29 URB. LAW 309, 310-12 (1997). 
 34. STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CASE STUDIES: RECENT CHANGES 1 (Charles Bartsch 
et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT]. 
 35. The delay inherent in brownfield remediation can drastically add to the costs of 
development, making the property even less desirable.  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, 
supra note 18, at 3.  In urban areas the delay is compounded by the fact that often several parcels 
must be combined to create a developable site.  Garson, supra note 30, at 178.  Ownership and past 
use of the properties must be traced, and environmental assessments must be undertaken before any 
development may proceed.  Id. 
 36. A study in Ohio uncovered that the cost of redeveloping a brownfield was four times the 
cost of building on a greenfield.  See BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 3. 
 37. See Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 4 (defining the brownfields 
problem as “an anchor weighing down the ship of today’s urban redevelopment movement”).  But 
see Georgette C. Poindexter, Separate and Unequal: A Comment on the Urban Development Aspect 
of Brownfields Programs, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 9 (1996) (arguing that the goal should not be to 
merely draw industry back to the urban core, but that the cities should  focus on attracting 
businesses outside the manufacturing sector). 
 38. Solo, supra note 5, at 304.  Often brownfields are well located near waterways, rail 
systems, highways, and with access to power and water lines.  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND 
REUSING, supra note 18, 2-3. 
 39. Infrastructure includes “transportation, communications, energy, water supply, and waste 
management systems.”  STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 34, at 2. 
 40. See Solo, supra note 5, at 304-305.  The threat of Superfund liability encourages suburban 
sprawl which “indirectly encourages greater levels of air and water pollution by requiring workers” 
7
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build roads in suburban areas leaving the urban infrastructure to 
crumble.41 
C.  Depressed Urban Areas 
In addition to environmental hazards, brownfield sites contribute to 
an area’s economic and social problems.42  The tax base in the area is 
threatened in a variety of ways.43  The industry leaves taking with it jobs 
and employment taxes that would have otherwise been paid into the 
city’s coffers.44  The profits of the industry are no longer funneled into 
the local economy.45  The loss of taxes also affects the funding available 
for the urban education systems and city services.46 
The potential for contamination greatly devalues the industrial 
site.47  Owners of property with possible contamination would rather 
abandon the property than face the cost of assessment and remediation.48  
An abandoned former industrial site is not likely to be maintained; 
thereby causing an aesthetic blight on the community that furthers the 
depressed nature of the area.49  The devaluation of property spreads 
                                                          
to commute further to work.  Id. at 305. 
 41. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 3.  This trend can be 
countered by effective transportation planning which encourages urban growth.  Id. at 49-52.  City 
planning can use transportation issues to encourage urban growth and reduce air pollution: 
eliminating minimum parking requirements in areas serviced by public transportation to discourage 
automobile use; increasing the density allowance in areas surrounding public transportation hubs; 
providing pedestrian walkways and bicycle paths; and allowing for mixed use urban neighborhoods 
so that commercial facilities are conveniently located next to residences.  Id. at 52 
 42. Solo, supra note 5, at n.12, citing James T. O’Reilly, Environmental Racism, Site Cleanup 
and Inner City Jobs: Indiana’s Urban In-fill Incentives, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 43, 45-46, 54 (1994) 
(noting that urban decline leads to “a greater need for services, poorer quality housing, poorly 
funded school systems, and higher crime rates.”). 
 43. E.g. Hubert H. Humphrey III, et al., Brownfields Legislation, Three States’ Experiences, 
12 NO. 9 NAAG NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3, 3 (1997). 
 44. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at viii. 
 45. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 46. Garson, supra note 30, at 177.  When the job base is depleted, less income and business 
tax are generated.  This tax base is “a critical source of funds for city services.”  Id. 
 47. The reclaimed property may also be worth less than the investment necessary to bring 
about reuse.  In St. Louis, Missouri the cost to remediate and redevelop a brownfield site cost the 
city $26.25 per square foot; the retail space that was created is worth $2.00 per square foot.  
BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 3-4.  Even if the site turns out to be 
uncontaminated the developer still needs to engage in costly environmental assessments. 
 48. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 9.  If an owner takes the initiative to test his property and 
discovers environmental contamination, then “he is obligated to report the release of the 
contamination.”  Chihak, supra note 19, at 256-57. 
 49. See Solo, supra note 5, at 285.  When brownfields “remain dormant . . . adjoining 
neighborhoods suffer.”  Id. 
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throughout the surrounding areas, further eroding the community tax 
base.50 
Inevitably, the city and the taxpayers are left with the “legal, 
regulatory, and financial burden[s]” that accompany an abandoned 
brownfield site.51  The loss of industry feeds a vicious cycle: industry 
moves out decreasing the tax base, and as a result the city’s 
infrastructure suffers and the unsightliness of the abandoned land 
discourages investment in the area.52  The land lies fallow inviting 
criminal activity and urban decline.53  Cities seeking to revitalize and 
draw jobs back to the urban core are looking to brownfield 
redevelopment as the answer.54 
III.  HINDRANCES TO REDEVELOPMENT 
A.  The Legislative Landscape 
A myriad of federal, state, and local laws exist regulating 
brownfields and their potential environmental impact.55  Many of these 
laws and regulations overlap and sometimes conflict causing confusion 
and ambiguity in determining potential liability.56  The most influential 
                                                          
 50. Property allowed to remain fallow costs municipalities potentially “hundreds of jobs, 
millions of tax dollars, and hundreds of thousands of dollars in wages that might circulate through 
the area, bringing still more economic benefits.”  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra 
note 18, at 2. 
 51. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 9.  Business owners “may directly deed the property to a 
municipality, the lender, or may simply ‘walk away’ and let the State foreclose on unpaid tax liens.”  
Id. 
 52. Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 6-7. 
 53. Id. 
 54. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at ix.  But see Poindexter, supra 
note 37, at 1.  The author chastises the shortsightedness of brownfield programs that look only at 
creating new jobs and preserving greenfields.  Id. at 1.  “Although the Brownfields Programs may 
solve present day employment problems, they also may create future environmental catastrophes.”  
Id. at 19. 
 55. Joseph Philip Forte, Environmental Due Diligence for the Real Estate Industry, in 6 THE 
ACREL PAPERS 5, 6 (Alan J. Robin et al. eds. 1994).  A brownfield may be subject to federal 
cleanup laws if: the property contains “non-naturally occurring” hazardous substances without a 
permit for such substances; if petroleum has been disposed on the site; if the site contains an 
underground storage tank housing hazardous materials and/or petroleum; or if a structure on the site 
has loose asbestos or asbestos materials.  Wagner, supra note 2, at 17-18. 
 56. Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 9.  The federal government, all state 
legislatures, and many local municipalities have enacted statutes, ordinances, and administrative 
regulations for the purpose of combating environmental abuses.  Osmond C. Howe, Introduction to 
6 THE ACREL PAPERS 1, 1 (Alan J. Robin et al. eds. 1994).  Developers seeking to examine the 
potential for liability and the cleanup requirements often find it difficult to determine the necessary 
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federal law is CERCLA, also known as Superfund.57  CERCLA 
authorizes action by the US EPA and provides funds for emergency 
cleanup of hazardous sites that pose an imminent threat to “public health 
or the environment.”58  CERCLA imposes strict liability59 on Potentially 
Responsible Parties (PRP’s)60 of property falling within the purview of 
the legislation.61  Liability under CERCLA is applied joint and 
severally.62  Therefore, those with the “deep pockets” and those who can 
most readily be found bear the burden even if they were not involved in 
the acts that led to contamination.63 
In response to the unfairness created by CERCLA’s inclusion of 
innocent parties in the liability scheme, Congress passed the Innocent 
Landowner Defense to Liability,64 also known as SARA.65  SARA only 
applies to owners who are unaware of contamination at the time the 
property is acquired.66  Unfortunately, the courts have failed to interpret 
                                                          
cleanup standard.  Wagner, supra note 2, at 17. 
 57. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 5. 
 58. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 7. 
 59. See supra note 5. 
 60. Potentially Responsible Parties are comprised of four classes of persons or entities 
including: (1)  present owner(s) and operator(s) of a property found to have contamination; (2) 
owners and/or operators of a site at the time the hazardous waste was disposed on the property; (3) 
the person(s) or entity(-ies) that arranged for the disposal of the hazardous material; and (4) the 
person(s) or entity(-ies) responsible for the transportation of the hazardous material.  42 U.S.C. § 
9607(a) (1988).  Although the actual text of the statute uses the conjunctive form when referring to 
“owners and operators,” the legislative history together with the rulings of other courts led the 
Eleventh Circuit to rule that the legislature actually intended the language to read “owners and/or 
operators.”  United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 3 (11th Cir. 1990); See also 
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp 556, 561 (W.D. Pa. 1989); But see 
Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments, 875 F. Supp 1545, 1555-1556 (S.D. Ala. 1995). 
 61. Carver, supra note 5, at 245.  Only certain sites, containing the most dangerous 
contaminates are considered Superfund sites.  Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 
5-6.  Unfortunately, until a property has been tested for contamination its liability under CERCLA is 
unknown.  See id. 
 62. See generally, Daniel D. Barnhizer, Joint and Several Liability and Contribution Under 
CERCLA Sections 107(a)(4)(B) and 133(f)(1), 18 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 563 (1994). 
 63. Lenders are often times the party that can be located with the deep pockets.  Defining the 
Brownfield Problem, supra note 14, at 8.  See also BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra 
note 18, at 6.  One small town mayor referred to the retroactive liability of CERCLA as a smart 
bomb that lands on the deepest pocket.  Id.  Although retroactive liability can have inequitable 
consequences, legislators are reluctant to repeal such provisions for fear of burdening the public 
with cleanup costs.  Id. 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1988). 
 65. Solo, supra note 5, at 295.  While SARA does help to some extent, it is not absolute 
assurance against liability under CERCLA, but merely a defense that can be asserted if CERCLA 
liability is pursued.  See Id. at 295-96. 
 66. Forte, supra note 55, at 8. 
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SARA with any consistency, which creates confusion for developers.67  
In order to be considered “innocent” under SARA, an owner must have 
made a diligent inquiry to determine whether contamination existed 
prior to obtaining the site.68 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) is another 
federal law with implications in brownfield redevelopment.69  RCRA 
was enacted prior to CERCLA to regulate the “generation, transport, 
treatment, and disposal of hazardous wastes.”70  However, RCRA’s 
focus on “the production of hazardous waste . . . left a gaping hole 
regarding the existing contamination” leading Congress to enact 
CERCLA.71  Although RCRA was set up with the purpose of managing 
hazardous waste, some of its corrective action provisions overlap with 
provisions of CERCLA creating confusion as to “which law governs 
hazardous materials at a specific site.”72 
In addition to the numerous federal laws regulating brownfields, 
many states have passed similar legislation known as “mini-CERCLA” 
statutes.73  These mini-CERCLA laws are mirrored after the federal 
Superfund Act, but usually have a larger scope, including sites that 
would not be considered Superfund sites at the federal level.74  Like its 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 9.  United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 716 F. Supp 1341 (D. Idaho 
1989) (The court held that children of shareholders who received shares of stock as gifts were not 
required to have made “appropriate inquiry.”); BCW Associates Ltd. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 
1988 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11275 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472 (S.D.N.Y. 
1990); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (landowners were responsible 
for release of contaminants by lessees regardless of their lack of participation or knowledge). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1992).  In order for a property owner to use the innocent owner 
defense, he must prove that: the property was acquired after the contamination had taken place; he 
was not in any way responsible for the contamination; he did not “know or have reason to know of” 
the contamination at the time the land was obtained; and he “took reasonable precaution against 
foreseeable acts or omissions of third parties.”  Forte, supra note 55, at 8.  The investment required 
for an assessment to merely determine whether contamination exists under the SARA due diligence 
requirement may be substantial.  Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 10.  The cost 
may “prohibit the assessment of smaller sites deemed unworthy of the investment.”  Id. 
 69. Wagner, supra note 2, at 16. 
 70. Id.  CERCLA governs the “cleanup and removal of hazardous wastes at abandoned 
dumpsites” while RCRA is concerned with preventing sites from becoming Superfund sites through 
“hazardous and solid waste management.”  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, 
at 12. 
 71. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 6. 
 72. Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 9-10; BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING 
AND REUSING, supra note 18 at 12.  RCRA regulations are often implicated at sites that have 
underground storage tanks, which contain “petroleum products” or other hazardous substances that 
pose the “threat of leaking or bursting into surrounding soils and groundwater.”  Id. at 14-15. 
 73. Wagner, supra note 2, at 17. 
 74. Id. at n.26.  For instance, the author notes that New Jersey has in place a more inclusive 
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federal counterpart, the state Superfund laws’ primary purpose is to 
compel PRP’s to engage in cleanups or risk liability.75 States are 
cognizant of the effect that federal environmental laws have had on 
brownfield redevelopment; therefore some states have insightfully 
incorporated statutes that encourage voluntary remediation.76 
B.  Liability 
The liability surrounding environmental risk has been described as 
“joint and several, perpetual, unlimited, and regardless of fault.”77  The 
risk of liability can far exceed the value of the property.78  Therefore, a 
developer contemplating the purchase of potentially contaminated 
property should first conduct an environmental audit, commonly referred 
to as a “Phase I Assessment” to determine what, if any, contamination 
exists.79  If the Phase I Assessment uncovers existing contamination, the 
developer or property owner will need to undertake additional 
assessments and engage consultants to determine the best course of 
action.80  The developer must survey the legal landscape to ensure that 
                                                          
hazardous substance list which includes petroleum products and other waste considered hazardous 
according to state standards.  Id.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11b (West 1995). 
 75. Carver, supra note 5, at 259-60.  States’ Superfund laws primary purpose is the cleanup of 
the most severely contaminated sites within the state that are not targeted by the federal government 
on the National Priorities List.  Id. at n. 39. 
 76. Wagner, supra note 2, at 17.  Voluntary cleanup statutes in each state aim to encourage 
remediation by offering release from state Superfund liability upon the site’s approved cleanup.  
Carver, supra note 5, at 251-252.  States may also have Federal SARA counterpart statutes which 
provide for an innocent purchaser defense, such as New Jersey’s Urban Redevelopment Act.  N. J. 
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11G(E)(1) (West 1995).  However, because New Jersey’s defense statute 
only applies to purchasers in “qualified municipalities,” it fails to provide true liability protection to 
all innocent purchasers.  Carver, supra note 5, at 264. 
 77. Forte, supra note 55, at 5; United States v. Shell Oil Co., 841 F. Supp. 962, 968 (C.D. Cal. 
1993) (finding PRP’s liability to be joint and several). 
 78. See note 47 (recognizing that the cost of cleanup far exceeded the clean properties’ value).  
The value of a brownfield property may be difficult to determine due to the unknown costs 
associated with cleanup.  Carver, supra note 5, at n.62.  Although almost everyone speculates as to 
the cost of cleanup, developers must not lose sight of the value of the property once it is cleaned.  
Kevin D. Margolis & Todd S. Davis, Doing the Brownfields Deal, in BROWNFIELDS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 53, 54 (Todd S. Davis & 
Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
 79. Walsh, supra note 6, at 199.  These investigative measures can prove to be costly with 
initial assessments costing as much as $5000.  Id.  Completion of this initial step usually requires 
the expertise of an environmental consultant and an environmental attorney “to prepare contract 
documents and evaluate the legal implications of information discovered during the audit.”  Steven 
M. Wheller & Edward Z. Fox, Avoiding Environmental Liabilities: A Primer for Business, 23 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 483, 508 (1991). 
 80. Walsh, supra note 6, at 199.  The significant costs involved in assessing possible 
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the correct level of cleanup is achieved in accordance with the governing 
regulations in the jurisdiction.81 
Risk of liability can still exist even after the appropriate level of 
cleanup is achieved.82  The EPA can still pursue action if a substance on 
the property is newly discovered to be harmful.83  There is also the risk 
that the initial audit did not detect all of the contamination, thereby 
creating the risk of future liability.84  This lack of finality serves as yet 
another deterrent to brownfield cleanup.85 
Developers especially avoid sites that are identified as Superfund 
sites on the NPL due to the high level of complexity and risk involved 
with a site with known serious hazardous contamination.86  Most states 
have focused their efforts on less contaminated sites, but a few states 
have successfully redeveloped sites listed on the NPL.87  These 
                                                          
contamination is a deterrent to current owners.  If the assessments uncover contamination, the cost 
of the required cleanup can cost millions of dollars.  For example, the environmental cleanup costs 
of two buildings located in the former BF Goodrich Tire facility in Akron, Ohio were estimated to 
be between two and three million dollars.  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, 
at 109.  The high cost of cleanup, coupled with the developer’s inability to find tenants, prevented 
the developer from obtaining financing, and eventually forced the developer into bankruptcy.  Id.  
The parcel was later purchased by another developer and remediation was successfully completed.  
Id. at 109-10. Today the buildings are home to Advanced Elastomer Systems, a polymer research 
firm.  Id. at 110. 
 81. See BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 10.  CERCLA establishes 
cleanup criteria based on the risk of cancer of the particular substance at the contaminated site.  Id.  
State cleanup programs also usually gage the level of cleanup to the intended end use of the 
property.  Id.  Congress has suggested five balancing factors as guides to determine the appropriate 
level of cleanup: “(1) effectiveness of the remedy, including implementability, technical 
practicability, and the ability to reduce risks; (2) reliability of the remedy over both the short and the 
long terms; (3) the remedy’s risks to the affected community, remediation workers, and the 
environment; (4) community acceptance of the remedy; and (5) reasonableness of the cost, 
compared to other available remedies.”  Id. at 11. 
 82. See Wortzel, supra note 33, at 313. 
 83. Id.  Property owners run the risk that future standards will change, and therefore require 
further cleanup efforts.  Tondro, supra note 28, at 814.  If a particular substance is later discovered 
to be dangerous, or previously undetected contamination is later uncovered at a previously cleaned 
site the owner would be liable for correcting the contamination.  Wortzel, supra note 33, at 313. 
 84. Solo, supra note 5, at 303. 
 85. Wortzel, supra note 33, at 313.  In response to this lack of finality some states have taken 
action by providing releases from liability that incorporate safeguards against liability under these 
circumstances.  See infra pp. 30-32 and 35-37. 
 86. Humphrey, supra note 43, at 5 (noting that such sites present “special challenges”).  See 
supra note 18, and accompanying text. 
 87. Humphrey, supra note 43, at 5.  An example of a successful NPL site cleanup is that of 
the New Brighton Project, located outside the Twin Cities in Minnesota.  Id.  The Project began 
with an agreement between the US EPA and the city of New Brighton outlining the cleaning and 
future use of a severely contaminated twenty-eight acre parcel of land.  Id.  The cleanup of the site 
is phased, with new manufacturing and commercial tenants selected to “to fit the city’s long-range 
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successes prove that the barriers to even the most contaminated sites can 
be bridged if a solid plan for cleanup and redevelopment is in place. 
C.  Lack of Financing Opportunities 
Financing for redevelopment of brownfields is difficult to obtain.88  
Lenders are concerned that the property will not be valuable as collateral 
due to possible contamination,89 or they feel that the borrowers will not 
be a good risk as cleanup costs deplete the borrower’s assets.90  The 
greatest deterrent to lenders, however, is the potential liability that the 
lender could face by its involvement with a borrower’s financial and 
environmental decisions.91  Lenders are discouraged from foreclosing on 
a property with possible contamination, because the lender could then be 
considered a responsible party as an “owner or operator” according to 
CERCLA.92 
Courts have broadly construed the law to find lending institutes 
liable for the environmental contamination caused by the borrower.93  In 
the landmark case of Fleet Factors, the Eleventh Circuit held that, “a 
secured creditor may incur section 9607(a)(2)94 liability, without being 
                                                          
plan for community revitalization.  Id.  The federal government has also undertaken to clean and 
reuse federally owned sites listed on the NPL as part the Department of Defense Environmental 
Restoration Program (DERP).  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 91-96.  
Under DERP the government is seeking to remediate and redevelop severely contaminated 
properties that were formerly used as military bases.  Id. 
 88. See Wheller & Fox, supra note 79, at 507 (noting that lenders will usually require “an 
independent environmental investigation of the property” before a loan will be considered). 
 89. Solo, supra note 5, at 298.  The possibility of contamination devalues land, creating a risk 
for the lender that their “collateral might prove worthless.”  Id. 
 90. Walsh, supra note 6, at 201.  If the borrower also has other loans through the same 
lending institute, the lending institute will be hesitant to loan toward a brownfield redevelopment 
project as the cleanup costs could potentially bankrupt the developer, jeopardizing the other loans 
the lending institute holds for the developer.  Id. 
 91. E.g. Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 10. 
 92. CERCLA does provide an exemption from liability for creditors who merely hold “an 
indicia of ownership primarily to protect a security interest” in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).  Monarch 
Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence, 212 F.3d 1219, 1222 (11th Cir. 2000).  Lenders fear that they would 
“forfeit the exemption by exercising their right of foreclosure, which could be thought to convert 
their ‘indicia of ownership’—the security interest—into actual ownership.”  Kelley v. 
Environmental Prot. Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1994); See also United States v. 
Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (D. Md. 1986). 
 93. See David H. Rockwell, The EPA’s CERCLA Lender Liability Rule, in 6 THE ACREL 
PAPERS 49 (1994). 
 94. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) (1992).  CERCLA also provides an exception from owner liability 
for secured creditors in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) which provides that the terms ‘owner’ and 
‘operator’ do not apply to creditors that do not participate in the management of the facility, but 
hold an ownership interest merely to protect its security interest in the property.  Monarch, 212 F.3d 
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an operator, by participating in the financial management of a facility to 
a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation’s treatment of 
hazardous waste.”95  Under this standard, the mere influential ability of 
the secured creditor is enough to trigger CERCLA liability.96  In 
response to this broad reading given to 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2), Congress 
amended CERCLA in 1996 adding a provision97 that limited the purview 
of the phrase, “participate in management.”98  Although the amended 
statute negated the specific holding in Fleet Factors, lenders are still 
rightfully cautious of the broad liability they could incur under 
CERCLA.99 
The US EPA attempted to address the inequities caused when 
CERCLA is applied to lending institutes by creating “safe harbors” to 
shield lenders from liability.100  However, in Kelly v. Environmental 
Protection Agency, the court held that although the EPA is given 
                                                          
at 1222. 
 95. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1990).  Fleet 
Factors involved a CERCLA action filed by the government against the shareholders of Swainsboro 
Print Works (SPW), a bankrupt company, and Fleet, a lending institute.  Emanuel County, Georgia 
involuntarily acquired the property due the bankruptcy of SWP.  Fleet subsequently acquired the 
property in the foreclosure sale in an effort to recoup its security interest in the facility.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency inspected the site and found asbestos and hazardous chemicals 
and filed the lawsuit.  The court held that Fleet was not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) as the 
present owner of the facility, because at the time the litigation began the county still held title to the 
property.  Id. at 1555.  The court did however find that there was enough evidence to hold Fleet 
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) as having participated in the management of the facility at the 
time the waste was disposed of at the site.  Id. at 1560.  The court felt that a broad reading of the 
lender liability provisions in CERCLA would encourage lenders to “address hazardous waste 
problems at the facility” rather than turn a blind eye to the hazard.  Id. at 1559. 
 96. The court in Fleet Factors elaborated that a creditor could be liable even if the creditor 
was not in a position to “participate in management decisions relating to hazardous waste.”  901 
F.2d 1550, at 1558.  This harsh position was taken by the court in an attempt to “achieve the 
‘overwhelmingly remedial’ goal of CERCLA statutory” liability.  Id. at 1557. 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(F)(i)(II) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 106-274, approved 9-22-2000). 
 98. Monarch Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence, 212 F.3d 1219, 1222 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 99. JoAnne S. Liu, Lender Liability Protection in the Aftermath of CERCLA’s Security 
Interest Exemption Crisis: Treating Lenders Like Lenders, 17 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 575, 598 
(1998). 
 100. Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of Superfund 
Liability, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 27, 31 (1996); Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra 
note 14, at 43-45; Daniel Riesel et al., Federal and State Brownfield Initiatives, 438 PRACTICING 
LAW INSTITUTE: REAL ESTATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 285, n.11 (1999).  
The EPA “instituted a rulemaking proceeding to define the secured creditor exemption [of 42 
U.S.C. 9601(20)(A)] when legislative efforts to amend CERCLA failed.”  Kelley v. United States 
Envirt. Prot. Agency, 15 F.3d 1100, 1104 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  The goal of the legislation was to 
provide clearer guidelines and standards by which lenders could determine their risk of liability, and 
to protect lenders from liability as owners under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) in situations where the 
lender acquires property through foreclosure.  Id. 
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authority to carry out enforcement of CERCLA it does not have 
statutory authority to promulgate rules regarding the standards by which 
liability will be imposed.101 
The extreme risks that lenders face when lending to owners or 
developers of brownfield sites has created the policy known as 
“brownlining” or “environmental redlining.”102  Brownlining occurs 
when a lender simply refuses to do business with “certain types of 
companies or properties that carry environmental risks.”103  Rather than 
risk the uncertainty of contamination lenders avoid the situation 
altogether, leaving brownfield developers with limited options.104 
D.  Greenfield Competition 
Property values for brownfield sites have been driven down due to 
the uncertainty of cleanup costs and the potential for liability, therefore 
brownfield property usually can be acquired for less than a greenfield 
parcel.105  Additionally, brownfield sites are often located near central 
business districts, waterways, public transportation, and large 
populations of potential workers.106  These benefits however do not 
outweigh the costs associated with redeveloping a brownfield site.107  A 
developer who is considering redeveloping a brownfield site must first 
conduct an environmental assessment of the land.108  Depending on the 
                                                          
 101. Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1105-1109.  “Liability issues are to be decided by the court.”  Id. at 
1107. 
 102. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 16. 
 103. Id.  This practice places even more obstacles in the way of small business that are trying 
to effectuate cleanup.  Id. at 17. 
 104. In Kelley v. Envirt. Prot. Agency, survey data was introduced  indicating “that lenders 
curtailed loans made to certain classes of borrowers or secured by some types of properties in order 
to avoid the virtually unlimited liability risk associated with collateral property that may be 
contaminated.”  Kelley, 15 F.3d at 1104. 
 105. Solo, supra note 5, at 298 (finding that the lack of a market for brownfield sites drives the 
price down). 
 106. Usually urban sites afford great views, access to medical centers, and a mature 
infrastructure.  Eisen, supra note 8, at 897. 
 107. Andrew, supra note 100, at 31.  Even with the aid of state led voluntary cleanup programs 
developers still find that it is economically wiser to develop a greenfield rather than to face the 
delay and expense that accompany brownfield redevelopment.  Id.  The Midtown Corridor Project 
in Cleveland, Ohio provides a typical example of the astronomical costs that can be incurred in 
developing a brownfield site.  Garson, supra note 30, at 179.  In this case the initial assessment 
found asbestos present, resulting in a net cost of $1.6 million per acre.  Id.  The price of an acre of 
greenfield property nearby could be purchased without the fear of liability for $20,000-$150,000.  
Id. 
 108. Walsh, supra note 6, at 199-202. 
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findings in the assessment, the developer is faced with uncertain cleanup 
standards and costs, long delays,109 and the lack of finality from liability 
if contamination is later found on the land.110  While the developer can 
sue to recover its liability costs from other PRP’s, developers run the 
risk that they will not be able to recover any of the remediation costs.111  
The government must provide incentives in order to encourage private 
investment into brownfield sites.112 
Even if a developer is willing to take the risk to redevelop a 
brownfield site, financing and environmental liability insurance113 may 
not be available for such and endeavor.  A development on a greenfield 
site is a much better risk for lenders than facing the potential liabilities 
that accompany redeveloping brownfield sites.114 
E.  Public Opposition 
The neighbors of a brownfield site are placed in a difficult position: 
                                                          
 109. Id. at 200.  Brownfields are even more undesirable when a developer considers the 
unpredictable nature of delays that accompany brownfield projects.  Id. 
 110. See supra note 83, and accompanying text (discussing the lack of finality that sometimes 
plagues brownfield cleanups). 
 111. SARA expressly provides that a “private part[y may] . . . bring suits for contribution to 
recover response costs incurred as a result of their cleanup of a hazardous waste site under section 
113(f)(1).”  Barnhizer, supra note 62, at 564. 
 112. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at viii.  These incentives can 
take many forms and are usually creatively adapted to the particular site.  Id.  State and local 
governments should first try and leverage existing federal programs, and then “fill the gaps” with 
innovative solutions such as voluntary cleanup programs.  Id. at viii-ix. 
 113. Another hindrance linked to the large scope of CERCLA liability is the difficulty 
developers may have in obtaining liability insurance.  Solo, supra note 5, at 300.  The extreme costs 
associated with environmental liability can bankrupt even the largest insurance companies.  Id.  As a 
result insurance companies have limited the amount of coverage available and have raised the 
premiums for environmental liability insurance.  Id.  See also Diane R. Archangeli, Using Old 
Insurance Policies as Weapons, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 154 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) (noting that 
insurance policies in effect at the time the initial contamination occurred may cover the liability 
faced by the current owner of the brownfield).  But see generally William McElroy & Todd S. 
Davis, Environmental Insurance in the Brownfields Transaction, in BROWNFIELDS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 144 (Todd S. Davis & 
Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) (suggesting that insurance is a workable option to help control 
liability risks when dealing with brownfield sites). 
 114. One survey of lenders found that over 40 percent of commercial lenders polled had 
withdrawn from a mortgage deal due to potential contamination of the site.  Defining the 
Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 10.  “About 87 percent of those bankers said that fear of 
environmental liabilities had delayed transactions.”  Id.  “And nearly 70 percent of the lenders 
surveyed indicated that problems due to contamination had actually come to fruition on properties 
they had mortgaged.”  Id. 
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continue to live by an abandoned, potentially contaminated property, or 
have the property redeveloped creating the danger of greater pollution by 
way of inexperienced and unsupervised cleanup efforts,115 relaxed 
cleanup standards, and new industrial polluters.116  Community members 
are concerned that hasty efforts to redevelop brownfields will create the 
risk that “threatening levels of contaminants” will be allowed to remain 
in the ground thereby threatening the local water supply and the 
residents’ health.117 
In an effort to generate brownfield redevelopment and draw 
business and industry back to the urban cores, states often implement 
tiered cleanup levels determined by the proposed end use of the land.118  
Relaxed cleanup standards coupled with the fact that brownfield sites are 
often situated in minority neighborhoods have led to the formation of the 
Environmental Justice movement.119  To address racial environmental 
injustices, minority communities want former industrial facilities to be 
transformed back into greenfields as opposed to being redeveloped into 
industrial sites that create a greater risk of environmental harm.120  The 
“selection of remedies, cleanup standards, and future land uses” must be 
carefully considered when redeveloping a brownfield site that is situated 
                                                          
 115. See Eisen, supra note 8, at 887-88 (questioning the effectiveness of states’ ability to 
oversee voluntary cleanups).  Eisen argues that “inadequate or ineffective cleanups” result when 
states allow developers to be responsible for the cleanup “with little or no state oversight.”  Id.  
Eisen places distrust in developers given their “shoddy environmental records.”  Id. at 888. 
 116. See id. at 887 (questioning the “democratic nature of the process” given the limited 
influence the affected residents have on what happens to the brownfields in their neighborhood). 
 117. Andrew, supra note 100, at 31. One commentator went so far as to suggest that states’ 
voluntary cleanup statutes “trade increased health risks to the affected community for the prospect 
of new jobs and higher tax revenues.”  Eisen, supra note 8, at 887.  Community members usually 
want a site to be cleaned to the highest level possible without regard to the end use.  John C. 
Chambers & Michelle A Meertens, Community Participation in Brownfields Redevelopment, in 
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 183, 188 
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
 118. See infra pp. 32-35. 
 119. See Espinosa, supra note 15, at 15-16.  The Environmental Protection Agency has 
described the environmental  justice movement as “the fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, 
and incomes with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental 
laws, regulations, programs, and policies.”  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 
18, at 46.  The environmental justice movement seeks to rectify past wrongs caused by the 
disproportionate siting of landfills and other hazardous waste sites near minority populations.  Id. 
 120. Chambers & Meertens, supra note 117, at 187.  See also Defining the Brownfields 
Problem, supra note 14, at 11 (noting the conflict these competing interests can create between 
developers and community members).  On the other hand, there is the risk that redevelopment will 
lead to “gentrification.”  Garson, supra note 30, at 186.  Gentrification occurs when the poor are 
displaced and can no longer afford to live in the revitalized areas.  Id. 
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in a minority community.121 
IV.  THE BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT EFFORT AT THE FEDERAL 
LEVEL 
The Clinton Administration created the Brownfields Action Agenda 
(Agenda) in an effort to increase brownfield redevelopment.122  The 
Agenda is aimed at “jump starting” brownfield redevelopment by 
lessening the confusion surrounding cleanup and liability; providing a 
concerted effort between federal, state, and local governments; and 
providing a framework for cleanup using the US EPA’s pilot program as 
a guide.123  The Agenda’s first concern was to try to alleviate some of 
the fear of Superfund liability.124 
A.  US EPA Prospective Purchase Agreements & Status/Comfort Letters 
In a Prospective Purchase Agreement, generally the US EPA issues 
a covenant not to sue in exchange for a prospective purchaser’s 
agreement to clean the site to specified levels.125  The assurance given is 
that the EPA will not pursue action against the purchaser if the specified 
level of cleanup is attained.126 
Prospective purchase agreements are not available in all 
circumstances, but the US EPA has expanded the situations in which 
they can be used.127  The following eligibility criteria must be met before 
the EPA will enter into a Prospective Purchase Agreement: (1) the EPA 
                                                          
 121. BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 46. 
 122. Jonathan D Weiss, The Clinton Administration’s Brownfields Initiative, in BROWNFIELDS 
A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY, 41, 41 (Todd S. Davis & 
Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).  The Agenda includes, among other initiatives: archiving the 
CERCLIS sites, clarifying and providing guidance on Prospective Purchase Agreements, and 
furthering the EPA’s Brownfield Pilot Program.  See generally id. 
 123. Id. at 41.  See infra pp. 31-33. 
 124. See Weiss, supra note 122, at 42. 
 125. Riesel, supra note 100, at 286; Weiss, supra note 122, at 42.  The EPA usually requires 
payment for a Prospective Purchase Agreement.  Riesel, supra at 285.  The payment to the EPA 
may fulfill the requirement that the EPA benefit in some way, either by way of the cleanup itself or 
through the receipt of funds to be used for cleanup efforts.  Id. 
 126. Riesel, supra note 100, at 285-86.  The parties agree on the level of cleanup prior to the 
issuance of the purchase agreement.  The cleanup level is selected to insure that the property will 
not pose a threat to those who come in contact with the site, or who live or work nearby.  See id. 
 127. Id.  Previously Prospective Purchase Agreements were available only if the EPA was 
planning on taking action, and the EPA would substantially benefit from the agreement.  Id.  The 
new policy takes into consideration the potential benefit the cleanup agreement will bring to the 
community.  Id. 
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and/or the community must be benefited; (2) the purchaser must have 
the necessary finances available to undertake the cleanup; (3) the 
cleanup effort and reuse of the property must not pose a health risk to the 
surrounding community; and (4) the site must be contaminated to a 
degree that further action by the EPA is anticipated.128 
Comfort letters, also known as status letters, are different from 
Prospective Purchase Agreements in that they offer no guarantee that 
action will not be taken against a particular site.129  Comfort Letters 
issued by the EPA generally alert a prospective purchaser to the 
likelihood of an EPA action that would create federal CECLA 
liability.130  Because status letters do little to allay the fear of liability, 
they are only available if: the party has a reasonable apprehension that 
Superfund liability might be incurred; the letter will likely spur 
remediation and redevelopment at a site; and “no other mechanism is 
available to address the party’s concerns.”131 
B.  US EPA’s Cooperation with States’ Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
The EPA is making an effort to cooperate with and encourage 
voluntary cleanup programs at the state level.132  The EPA’s first step 
was to remove 24,000 sites from CERCLIS,133 the Superfund database, 
in order to encourage state action.134  The removal of a site from 
CERCLIS helps to “assur[e] the parties that no federal action [is] 
expected.”135  Additionally, the EPA has created Superfund 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) Guidelines to evaluate state 
voluntary cleanup programs.136  If a state’s voluntary cleanup program 
                                                          
 128. Riesel, supra note 100, at 285-86.  Weiss, supra note 122, at 42-43. 
 129. Riesel, supra note 100, at 286-88. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Riesel, supra note 100, at 287. 
 132. Andrew, supra note 100, at 30.  Although the EPA is making an effort to cooperate with 
state efforts, the EPA has made it clear that the EPA “does not intend to ‘staff-up’ to run voluntary 
cleanups under the state program.”  Id. 
 133. CERCLIS database contains nearly 40,000 potentially hazardous sites.  Weiss, supra note 
122, at 42.  The 24,000 sites that were removed are sites that “USEPA had already screened, 
sometimes years before, and had found to be of no further federal interest.”  Id. 
 134. Andrew, supra note 100, at 30; Riesel, supra note 100, at 288; Weiss, supra note 122, at 
42. 
 135. Carol M. Browner, Brownfields are Becoming Places of Opportunity, 13 J. NAT 
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. I, II (1997-1998). 
 136. Riesel, supra note 100, at 288-89.  The guidelines set out the “baseline criteria” by which 
the EPA will evaluate each states’ voluntary cleanup program.  Id. at 288.  The MOA will vary with 
each state according to the specifics of each states’ program.  For instance, in Indiana a MOA will 
not be issued for property that is listed on the NPL.  Anne Slaughter Andrew, Indiana, in 
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meets the criteria set out in the MOA guidelines, the EPA will issue the 
state a MOA, which insures the state that the EPA will not seek 
CERCLA action against properties that are a part of that state’s 
voluntary cleanup program.137 
C.  US EPA’s Brownfield Pilot Program138 
The most promising of the federal initiatives aimed at brownfield 
redevelopment is the recent EPA Brownfield Pilot Program, which was 
developed as part of the comprehensive federal Brownfield Action 
Agenda.139  Under the program, the EPA awards grants of up to 
$200,000 to communities to encourage and spur on brownfield 
redevelopment.140  The main purpose of the pilot program is to provide 
                                                          
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY  402, 
403 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) [hereinafter Indiana].  In Utah a MOA is 
available for “cooperative actions on federal NPL qualifying sites” but a MOA is not available for 
Utah’s voluntary cleanup program.  H. Michael Keller, Utah, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 610, 612 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D 
Margolis eds., 1997).  The MOA generally sets out the roles and responsibilities of each party with 
respect to the states’ voluntary cleanup program.  Riesel, supra note 100, at 289. 
 137. Riesel, supra note 100, at 288-89.  States that have received a MOA from the US EPA 
include: Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Texas, and Wisconsin.  David 
J. Engel, Illinois, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 385, 394 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); David F. Goossen, Colorado, 
in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 344, 
346 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); Arthur J. Harrington, Wisconsin, in 
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 665, 676 
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); Indiana, supra note 136, at 403; Paul S. Moe, 
Minnesota, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 487, 490-91 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); James T. Price & Jennifer 
A. Downs, Missouri, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 501, 503 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997); John 
Slavich, Texas, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 601, 602 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D Margolis eds., 1997); Grant R. Trigger, Michigan, 
in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 461, 
468 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).  A state’s MOA may be rescinded if a state’s 
standards are amended and fall below that which is required by the US EPA.  Engel, supra at 394. 
 138. Browner, supra note 135, at I. 
 139. See id. at V.  To be considered for a grant, a city, county, Indian tribe or state must make 
an application to the EPA indicating that it has identified contaminated properties that provide “the 
greatest opportunity for remediation and economic activity.”  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND 
REUSING, supra note 18, at 32; Weiss, supra note 122, at 45.  Pilots are then selected according to 
“(1) the applicant’s problem statement and needs assessment, (2) evidence of community-based 
planning and involvement, (3) the applicant’s implementation plan, and (4) the long-term benefits 
and sustainability of the project.”  Id. 
 140. See Eisen, supra note 8, at 980.  The money granted under the Brownfield Pilot Program 
is not to be put toward the actual cleanup but is to be used to conduct site investigation and 
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learning models of brownfield redevelopment.141  Through the use of the 
pilots the Action Agenda aims to: develop clear liability and cleanup 
standards,142 create a team effort by engaging private investors and 
community members,143 and encourage “job training programs”144 in 
order to educate the local workforce.145 
The first pilot program grant was awarded to Cuyahoga County in 
Ohio.146  The success of this initial pilot served as a model for other 
communities.147  Since the Pilot Program’s inception in 1993, over 300 
                                                          
assessments, establish and test “redevelopment  strategies and models,” and to foster 
communication and collaboration between the “stakeholders involved in brownfield policy.”  Id. at 
981. 
 141. Browner, supra note 135, at V.  To that end, the EPA has even referred to the pilot 
program as “pilot demonstration projects.”  BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 
18, at 32.  In an effort to learn from the pilots the EPA held the first Brownfields Pilot National 
Workshop in 1996 to gather feedback from the various stakeholders involved in previous pilots.  
Weiss, supra note 122, at 46. 
 142. The goal of simplifying the administrative element of the cleanup process was to be 
accomplished through the “Memorandum of  Understanding” (MOU).  Espinosa, supra note 15, at 
13.  The mission of the MOU as defined by the EPA is to “establish policies and procedures for a 
general working agreement between [various federal agencies] in support of the EPA’s Brownfield 
Economic Redevelopment Initiative.”  Id. at 13-14.  By distilling the various federal agency policies 
into a single guideline, the EPA hopefully can simplify an otherwise complex process.  See id. at 13. 
 143. One of the goals of the EPA’s Brownfield Pilot Program is to unite communities through 
the joint involvement of local residents and businesses in the redevelopment effort.  Eisen, supra 
note 8, at 982.  The EPA “is committed to involving residents in every step of brownfields 
redevelopment - from applying for pilot programs to deciding how sites will be used in the future.”  
Weiss, supra note 122, at 46.  Community meetings are a simple way to gather residents input and 
give the citizens a voice.  Citizen input helps to lessen the tension in delicate matters such as 
environmental justice.  See Weiss, supra note 122, at 46. 
 144. Training programs have been incorporated into local community college curriculums and 
provided in workshop form in pilots in Maryland and California.  Weiss, supra note 122, at 46-47.  
In Ohio, the EPA provided a grant for the purpose of creating a curriculum at the Cuyahoga 
Community College, otherwise known as Tri-C, that would support job-training efforts.  
BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 34. 
 145. Browner, supra note 135, at V. 
 146. Weiss, supra note 122, at 45.  The Cuyahoga County Planning Commission chose to use 
the $198,000 grant to investigate and initiate cleanup at three Cleveland area sites.  BROWNFIELDS: 
CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 33.  One of the sites, known as the Hauserman site, 
involved a building situated on contaminated ground which required “soil vapor extraction and 
groundwater remediation.”  Id.  The successful cleanup and redevelopment of the site into a 
distribution center has created 170 jobs that have generated over one million dollars in payroll taxes 
for the local government.  Weiss, supra note 122, at 46. 
 147. Weiss, supra note 122, at 46.  The Buffalo, New York pilot offers a unique example of 
innovative reuse of a brownfield site.  Browner, supra note 135, at II.  A contaminated former 
Republic Steel property is being redeveloped as a “35-acre hydroponic tomato farm” which will 
employ 165 workers.  Id.  The innovative use is a “nonpolluting industry, with water and heat 
recycled through the system,” and is operational without the use of chemical fertilizers and 
pesticides.  Id.  Pittsburgh is another city that is benefiting from the EPA Brownfield Pilot Program.  
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brownfield pilots have been implemented.148  The EPA Pilot Program 
demonstrates that a relatively small grant can lead to marked 
improvements and be an impetus to revitalization.149 
V.  OHIO’S CURRENT BROWNFIELD PROGRAMS 
A.  Voluntary Cleanup Programs 
Ohio’s Voluntary Action Program, (VAP)150 or Program, was 
enacted to encourage voluntary remediation and development within the 
state that had been “chilled” due to the fear of liability under 
CERCLA.151  Ohio’s VAP was developed with the aid of environmental 
experts who “establish[-ed] comprehensive and specific guidelines for 
conducting brownfields projects.”152  Ohio’s Program is unique in that 
certified professionals oversee the cleanup process, and certified labs 
conduct the testing.153 
Voluntary action under the statute may be undertaken by anyone, 
including Potentially Responsible Parties,154 as long as the site is not 
                                                          
Id.  Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, ravaged by industrial and economic decline, is using the pilot program 
grant to spur redevelopment at several sites.  Id. at III.  One site in particular, known as Nine-Mile 
Dump, is transforming a slag dump into a residential development.  Id. at III-IV.  Slag is “a gravel-
like byproduct” of the steel industry.  Id.  Since removal of the slag would be cost prohibitive, the 
city plans to re-grade the slag and then add a three foot layer of topsoil on the top.  Id.  When the 
development is complete a waterfront “park-like” 1000 home residential development will replace 
what had previously been an eyesore and a blight on the city.  See id. 
 148. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 15. 
 149. See Browner, supra note 135, at I. 
 150. OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 3746 (West 2000).  Ohio’s Voluntary Action Program, also 
known as Voluntary Real Estate Reuse and Cleanup Program, helps to expedite the cleanup process 
by enhancing the predictability of voluntary environmental cleanups.  Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. 
Margolis, Ohio, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 542 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997) [hereinafter Ohio]. 
 151. Michel, supra note 12, at 453. 
 152. Dan B. Brown, The Science of Brownfields, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 
TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 197, 209 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 
1997). 
 153. Id. at 209-10.  The requirements of a certified professional are enumerated in OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3746.07.  Critics of Ohio’s program note that Ohio has not received a MOA from the 
US EPA in part because the Ohio EPA leaves so much of the VAP in the hands of certified 
professionals.  Editorial, Cities Need Help With Brownfields, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Mar. 29, 2000, 
at 8A.  In denying Ohio’s Voluntary Action Program in a Memorandum of Understanding (also 
known as a Memorandum of Agreement), the US EPA stated that Ohio’s VAP “is privately 
operated, poorly monitored and has no public involvement.”  Id. 
 154. Whether potentially responsible parties should be included in voluntary cleanup programs 
and eligible for liability release is a subject of debate.  See infra pp. 30-32. 
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precluded under § 3746.02.155  In order to become a volunteer under 
Ohio’s VAP, a person must undertake a “voluntary action.”156  First, a 
volunteer should conduct a Phase I157 property assessment to determine 
what if any contamination exists at the site.158  If the Phase I property 
assessment detects contamination a Phase II159 assessment should be 
conducted to discover the extent of the contamination.160  Then a 
certified professional, with the aid of a certified lab, will conduct all 
cleanup activity.161  Once the property is certified as having reached 
acceptable levels of cleanup according to applicable standards, a 
certified professional may issue a no further action (NFA) letter.162  The 
certified professional then submits the NFA letter to the director of the 
Ohio EPA, who in turn issues a covenant not to sue163 to the volunteer.164 
                                                          
 155. A site is ineligible for participation in the VAP if it is precluded by overriding federal or 
state legislation such as, but not limited to: The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments 
of 1972, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251, as amended; RCRA, 42 U.S.C.A. 6921, as amended; CERCLA, 42 
U.S.C.A. § 9601, as amended; The Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 300(F); and OH. REV. 
CODE §§ 3737.88, 3737.882, 3737.889 (relating to remediation governed by the fire marshal).  OHIO 
REV. CODE § 3746.02 (West 2000). 
 156. Ohio, supra note 150, at 543.  Voluntary action can include a Phase I or Phase II property 
assessment, a sampling plan, a remediation plan, or other remedial actions that are “necessary or 
appropriate to address the contamination.”  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(A) (West 2000). 
 157. Phase I assessments under the Ohio Program are conducted according to the American 
Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards and procedures.  Brown, supra note 152, at 
204. 
 158. Id. at 203. 
 159. Instead of developing a single procedure for the Phase II assessments, Ohio’s Program 
relies on the guidance of a certified professional to develop the plan for the Phase II process.  Id. at 
209-10.  The professional also ensures that procedures are followed according to the risk-
assessment guidelines.  Id. at 210.  For an easy to understand explanation of Ohio’s innovative use 
of risk based standards, see id. at 210-11. 
 160. Id. at 211. 
 161. Ohio, supra note 150, at 542. 
 162. The certified professional may issue the NFA letter: if the Phase I or II property 
assessment indicates that contamination is not present or is within applicable standards; or if 
remediation has been conducted under the VAP and data indicates that contamination is within 
applicable standards; if the property standards are based on the end use of the land and the 
appropriate restrictions have been recorded on the deed; and if the remediation was achieved by 
engineering controls, and a “plan for the proper operation and maintenance of the engineering 
controls” is in place. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.10(C) (West 2000). 
 163. The covenant not to sue provides the volunteer with the assurance that the state will not 
pursue a suit based on contamination that occurred prior to cleanup.  See Brian Thomas Lang, Note, 
Ohio’s Voluntary Action Program: Solving Ohio’s Toxic Waste Woes?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 285, 303 
(1999).  Unfortunately, the covenant issued by the state offers no immunity from federal liability.  
Id.  The US EPA’s “current enforcement position does not contemplate pursuing an enforcement 
action in connection with a site that is participating in the Voluntary Action Program.”  Ohio, supra 
note 150, at 544.  Ohio is currently seeking a MOA from the US EPA which will provide VAP 
participants assurance that federal liability will not be pursued.  Id. 
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Ohio’s VAP has been both applauded and criticized.  Those who 
favor the program praise its comprehensiveness165 and cite examples of 
successful brownfield reclamation projects that would not have been 
possible without the aid of the VAP.166  The opposition argues that by 
allowing PRP’s to participate in the program, the VAP goes easy on 
environmental polluters.167  Other opponents argue that Ohio’s VAP 
fails because the US EPA does not endorse it; therefore it does not 
absolve an owner of federal liability for cleanup.168 
B.  Financing Programs 
Release from liability alone will not be enough to persuade 
developers to choose to redevelop a brownfield site over a greenfield 
site.169  Remediation is very costly and fraught with unknowns.170  Ohio 
                                                          
 164. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.12(A) (West 2000).  The director must issue the volunteer 
a covenant not to sue if the NFA is submitted by a certified professional and is accompanied by 
verification under § 3746.11.  Although little governmental control is placed over the cleanup 
process, the director must audit at least twenty-five percent of the sites receiving NFA letters to 
ensure that the certified professionals and the certified labs are qualified.  Lang, supra note 163, at 
297. 
 165. Ohio, supra note 150, at 542. 
 166. See Lang, supra note 163, at 285 (crediting the Ohio VAP with the successful 
redevelopment of a contaminated former penitentiary site in Columbus, Ohio into a new sports 
arena to house the NHL expansion team, the Columbus Blue Jackets). 
 167. A.J. Renner, Taft Visits Canton to Promote Issue I, THE CANTON REPOSITORY, Oct. 26, 
2000, at B-3. (criticizing Ohio’s VAP for allowing “polluters to clean up brownfields without 
oversight from the Ohio EPA”) 
 168. See Editorial, Bonds Offer Potential to Clean, Preserve Ohio, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 
2, 2000, at 10B (“[F]ederal liability still exists, because the U.S. EPA says Ohio’s VAP program 
relies too heavily on self-monitoring and allows virtually no public oversight”).  Release from 
liability under Voluntary Action Programs may be misleading because while a state has the 
authority to release a site from the state’s mini-CERCLA law, states do not have the authority to 
release a developer from Federal CERCLA liability without the approval of the United States EPA.  
See BROWNFIELDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 34.  Ohio is seeking a Memorandum 
of Agreement from the United States EPA that endorse the actions of the Ohio VAP.  Ohio, supra 
note 150, at 544.  If a Memorandum of Agreement is obtained by the Ohio EPA, then covenants not 
to sue issued by the state will also be recognized by the federal government.  Id.  Currently, land 
owners may seek status letters from the federal government, but unless a state’s VAP is given a 
Memorandum of Agreement from the United States EPA a VAP participant is not completely 
shielded from federal liability.  Id.  But see id. at 542 (Ohio’s VAP is considered to be “among the 
most comprehensive and progressive voluntary cleanup legislation enacted in any state to date.”). 
 169. See Garson, supra note 30, at 180 (noting that the cost and trouble of conducting audits 
and assessments is difficult to overcome when greenfield parcels are available at a better price). 
 170. Eisen, supra note 8, at 907-11.  Part of the uncertainty surrounding brownfield 
remediation is attributed to “considerable vagueness and uncertainty associated with applicable 
cleanup standards.”  Id. at 907.  Lack of finality and technical complexity add to the unknowns.  Id 
at 910-11; see generally Michael L. Gargas & Thomas F. Long, The Role of Risk Assessment in 
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has developed several programs to help property developers fund 
brownfield redevelopment efforts including: the Urban Redevelopment 
Loan Program,171 the Water Pollution Control Loan Fund,172 Ohio Water 
Development Authority Loans,173 the Competitive Economic 
Development Program,174 and the Urban and Rural Initiative Grant 
Program.175  In addition to the government subsidized loans, Ohio 
provides protection to lending institutes that provide loans to 
brownfields projects that are a part of the VAP.176  Ohio offers additional 
financial incentives in the way of tax credits through the Brownfield Site 
Cleanup Tax Credit Program and tax abatements177 for the amount 
assessed to the increase in property value attributed to site 
remediation.178 
VI.  ELEMENTS COMMON TO A SUCCESSFUL BROWNFIELD INITIATIVE—
OTHER STATES’ EXPERIENCES 
In order for a state program to succeed, it must work in tandem with 
                                                          
Redeveloping Brownfields Sites, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING 
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 214 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
 171. The Urban Redevelopment Loan Program provides loans, up to five million dollars, to 
governmental and not-for-profit entities to fund development in “distressed areas.”  STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra note 7, at 13. 
 172. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6111.036 (West 2000).  The Water Pollution Control Loan Fund 
provides “low-interest loans for water-related brownfield activities.” STATE OF THE STATES, supra 
note 7, at 13. 
 173. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 6123.032 (West 2000).  The Ohio Water Development 
Authority provides loans to public or private actors for the purpose of site remediation.  STATE OF 
THE STATES, supra note 7, at 13. 
 174. The Competitive Economic Development Program provides grants to “small cities (less 
than 50,000) and small counties, for business expansion and retention purposes.  STATE OF THE 
STATES, supra note 7, at 13.  The grants are given to enable the cities to provide loans to businesses 
in order to fund “projects that will create or retain jobs.”  Id. 
 175. The Urban and Rural Initiative Grant Program provided funding to not-for-profit and 
governmental entitites for the purpose of developing “distressed areas.”  STATE OF THE STATES, 
supra note 7, at 13.  As of 1998, there were no funds remaining in this program.  Id.  OHIO. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 6123.041 (West 2000); Andrew, supra note 100, at 30. 
 176. Margaret Murphy, Brownfields Sites: Removing Lender Concerns as a Barrier to 
Redevelopment, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED 
PROPERTY 100, 105 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
 177. The increase in property value attributed to cleanup is automatically “exempted from real 
estate taxes for a ten year period” under OHIO REV. CODE § 5709.87; Ohio, supra note 150, at 545. 
 178. Andrew, supra note 100, at 30; STATE OF THE STATES, supra note 7, at 13.  The federal 
government also offers developers a tax incentive through the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  
Browner, supra note 135, at VI.  The Act creates a tax incentive by allowing businesses to deduct 
the cost of cleanup immediately, instead of having to spread the cost over many years by way of 
depreciation.  Id. 
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the federal initiatives and guidelines.  It must comprehensively address 
and respond to the issues that serve as hindrances to brownfield cleanup 
and redevelopment.  When a legislature considers creating or changing a 
state brownfield redevelopment initiative, much can be learned by 
examining what has worked for other communities. 
A.  Liability Shield 
Because the fear of liability is an impediment to brownfield 
redevelopment, releases from liability are a necessary component of 
state brownfield initiatives.179  The question then becomes, ‘Who should 
be eligible for release?’180  While it is commonly accepted that potential 
purchasers should be eligible for releases from liability, the line is less 
clear when dealing with present owners, or even actual polluters.181  A 
drawback to disallowing PRP’s to participate in voluntary cleanups and 
to benefit from subsequent liability releases is that many sites will 
remain contaminated.182  In order to be effective, the law must retain 
liability for any later pollution caused by the party.183  However, the 
release from liability should protect the party from subsequently 
“tightened standards or reemergence.”184 
                                                          
 179. C.f. David B. Hawley, Note, The Brownfields Property Reuse Act of 1997: North 
Carolina Creates Additional Incentives to Reclaim Contaminated Properties, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 
1026-27 (1998). 
 180. State voluntary cleanup programs vary as to who should be eligible for release.  Some 
states’ voluntary cleanup programs, such as Ohio and New York, permit Potentially Responsible 
Parties (PRP) to be released from liability.  See Michel, supra note 12, at 454 (Instead of focusing 
on the culpability of the participant, Ohio looks at whether the site is precluded from participation 
under an overriding federal or state statute.); Vogel, supra note 31, at 106.  Because PRPs, as 
defined under CERCLA, include present owners of a property, a party who was in no way 
responsible for the contamination can be considered a PRP.  Solo, supra note 5, at 293. 
 181. Solo, supra note 5, at 311.  Solo suggests that those eligible for release could be 
categorized into three groups: (1) parties with some connection to the contamination; (2) parties 
who subsequently purchased the property after the contamination had taken place; and (3) 
prospective purchases who were not connected to the contamination on the site.  Id. 
 182. Vogel, supra note 31, at 106.  Allowing “polluters” to obtain a release from liability if a 
site is cleaned may “encourage cleanup of . . . mildly contaminated sites.”  Solo, supra note 5, at 
312.  However a state may be “concerned that allowing a potentially responsible party to participate 
and gain a release from future liability, would preclude the state from seeking cost recovery from 
the same party.”  Vogel, supra note 31, at 106. 
 183. If parties are not liable for later pollution, the release would amount to a license to pollute.  
See Solo, supra note 5, at 314. 
 184. Id.  The release should protect developers in the event that the law subsequently changes 
requiring a more stringent level of cleanup, or cleanup of a substance not previously recognized as 
harmful.  Id.  Developers also fear later liability resulting from previously undiscovered 
contamination that “emerges” after the site has been cleaned and a release has been issued.  Id. 
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State programs have also taken into account the effect that lender 
liability has had on brownfield development.185  States are explicitly and 
implicitly providing liability protection to lenders in order to encourage 
brownfield financing.186  Several states’ brownfield statutes offer 
protection to lenders by narrowing the definition that the courts have 
given to the phrase ‘participate in the management of the property.’187 
B.  Comprehensive Redevelopment Framework: Structured Cleanup 
Standards & Administrative Controls 
Although Brownfield redevelopment is at the forefront of many 
political campaigns, “few communities or cities have taken positive 
concrete steps toward implementing a meaningful brownfield 
strategy.”188  Developers and property owners seeking to remediate and 
redevelop brownfields must navigate through a complex web of federal, 
state, and local cleanup requirements.189  States can alleviate some of the 
confusion surrounding brownfield redevelopment by developing 
“detailed cleanup standards that offer guidance to the landowner . . . and 
lenders in evaluating the reuse and value of a particular site.”190 
Through a minor change to its state voluntary cleanup program, 
Minnesota has tried to lessen the uncertainty in order to encourage 
voluntary cleanup.191  Minnesota’s Pollution Control Agency provides 
technical advice to those interested in purchasing or cleaning a 
property.192  Since its inception, the program has successfully provided a 
                                                          
 185. Murphy, supra note 176, at 105. 
 186. Id.  Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Indiana have proactively taken steps to 
limit lender liability.  Id. at 103-07.  Illinois has implicitly limited lender liability by apportioning 
liability based on the degree of fault.  This limits the joint and several strict liability that is 
traditionally applied to any entity that fell within the definition of owner or operator.  Id. at 105.  
Michigan explicitly precludes parties from liability if they have become owners or operators merely 
through foreclosure and have completed an assessment within 45 days of foreclosure and have 
reported the results of the assessment.  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 20126(1)(c) (West 2000). 
 187. Murphy, supra note 176, at 105.  For example Ohio’s statute defines “the key phrase 
‘participate in the management,’ as actual participation in the management or operational affairs.”  
Id. at 104; OH. REV. CODE ANN. § 3746.26(A)(1)(b) (Baldwin, WESTLAW through 2000 portion 
of 123 G.A.). 
 188. Defining the Brownfields Problem, supra note 14, at 11. 
 189. As eloquently stated by one scholar, “[t]he typical business often needs a lawyer, scientist, 
engineer, and the patience of Job to digest and understand the literally thousands of pages of federal, 
state, and local statutes, regulations, guidelines, policies, and judicial opinions that set forth the 
environmental mandates for transacting business.”  Wheller & Fox, supra note 79, at 496. 
 190. Tondro, supra note 28, at 794. 
 191. Humphrey, supra note 43, at 3. 
 192. Id.  The Program, known as the Minnesota Property Transfer Program, helps allay some 
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“fast and efficient way to identify environmental concerns and quantify 
any cleanup costs,” thereby removing some of the uncertainty and delay 
surrounding brownfield development.193 
Federal cleanup standards usually require that brownfield land be 
returned “to an unreasonably pristine condition.”194  Because this level 
of cleanup creates a cost barrier that is difficult to overcome, many states 
have developed “risk-based corrective action standards.”195  A  risk-
based standard directly ties the level of cleanup required to the intended 
future use of the site, ensuring that proper levels of cleanup will be 
attained to a level that minimizes health risks.196 
Developers in states that have adopted risk-based standards have 
more flexible means of dealing with contamination at certain sites.197  In 
non-residential brownfield redevelopment, environmental engineering 
controls may be used instead of traditional “permanent” cleanup 
techniques.198  Capping is an environmental engineering method of 
containment that is used to prevent the contamination from spreading or 
                                                          
of the concerns created by the potential for Superfund liability.  Id.  The property owner must still 
pay the agency for its services.  Id. 
 193. Id. at 4.  Pennsylvania has developed a similar program entitled the Pennsylvania Land 
Recycling Program.  Chihak, supra note 19, at 260.  The Land Recycling Program (Program) is 
revolutionary in that it provides  “developers a clear understanding of how to gain governmental 
approval for their projects.”  Id. at 261.  Pennsylvania publishes a 250 page technical manual on 
cleanup guidelines for use by developers and lenders.  Id. at 263.  The Program is also 
administratively advanced in that it has created an information database in order to track brownfield 
sites and cleanup efforts.  Id.  The database can be used by developers and planners as they decide 
which sites to address.  Id.  The database is also used as a measurement device to illustrate the 
benefits brownfield redevelopment can have by tracking the number of jobs and the increase in tax 
revenue created by brownfield redevelopment.  Id.  Louisville, Kentucky has a similar database 
“containing information on ownership, property characteristics, zoning, land use, permits, 
environmental history and tax measures” for over 20, 000 parcels.  Id. at 268. 
 194. Solo, supra note 5, at 308. 
 195. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1103. 
 196. Garson, supra note 30, at 180-181.  Risk assessments take into account the “potentially 
deleterious effects of human exposure to environmental hazards.”  Richard L. Cristea, M.D., Risk 
Assessment - A Physician’s Introduction, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 268, 268 (Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 
1997).  Risk based corrective action aims to “ensure that appropriate and cost-effective remedies 
that are technically defensible and protective of human health and the environment are selected.”  
James R. Rocco & Lesley Hay Wilson, The Risk-Based Corrective-Action Process, in 
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 250, 257 
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997). 
 197. See Espinosa, supra note 15, at 26.  By allowing the cleanup standards to be determined 
on a site by site basis according to the risks at a particular site, states “speed[] the process of 
redevelopment” and decrease the overall costs.  Chihak, supra note 19, at 261-62.  The money 
saved can be spent toward the remediation of other state sites.  Id. 
 198. Tondro, supra note 28, at 795. 
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seeping into the groundwater.199  Where containment is not possible at 
sites intended for industrial use “on site treatment alternatives such as 
vapor extraction200 and soil washing201 may be utilized,” in lieu of 
excavation and removal of contaminated soil.202  These alternative 
treatments are not only cost effective, but they can also be completed in 
less time than traditional contamination removal procedures.203 
Flexible cleanup standards allow cleanup to “be based on actual 
threats to human health and the environment.”204  Future commercial or 
industrial uses usually will be permitted to have higher contamination 
levels than sites that are intended for future residential use.205  If variable 
cleanup standards are permitted limits must be placed on the future use 
of the land.206 
Proponents of risk-based uses point to the numerous sites that 
would have remained severely contaminated were it not for the risk-
based standards, which allowed the property to be put back into 
                                                          
 199. Capping usually involves encapsulating, or covering the polluted ground, with an “an 
impermeable barrier such as concrete.”  Id. at 795.  Capping is only permissible when it can be 
justified by a cost benefit analysis.  Id.  In order for capping to be justified it must be significantly 
less expensive to cap the site relative to traditional cleanup measures, and the risks to human health 
and the environment cannot be “significantly greater” than traditional cleanup remedies.  Id. 
 200. The vapor extraction technique is used to remove volatile organic chemicals (VOCs) from 
the soil.  Edward J. Cichon, Remediation Strategies for Brownfields Redevelopment, in 
BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 273, 280 
(Todd S. Davis & Kevin D. Margolis eds., 1997).  Most commonly vapor extraction is achieved 
through the “the placement of a subsurface network of collection pipes through which vapors are 
extracted by vacuum to an above-ground treatment system.”  Id. 
 201. Soil washing may be accomplished “in-situ,” meaning the soil can be “washed” without 
removal, or “[e]x-situ,” which requires that the soil be removed from the site in order to be treated.  
Id. at 278.  Soil washing separates the silts, clays, and humic materials, which usually contain the 
contaminants, from the other components of soil.  Id. 
 202. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 26. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1103-04, citing Brian Hill & Joanne Denworth, Pennsylvania 
Envtl. Council, REPORT ON REUSE OF INDUSTRIAL SITES ROUNDTABLES 2, 4 (1993).  However, 
once legislators decide to adopt flexible risk based cleanup standards, the question becomes: ‘How 
clean is clean?’.  Robertson, supra at 1104. 
 205. Cichon, supra note 200, at 276.  For example, in the MidTown project in Cleveland the 
developer of an industrial site “was required to test the groundwater 150 feet deep.”  Garson, supra 
note 30, at 181.  While this may have been an appropriate inquiry if the site was to be used for non-
industrial use, “it is much too stringent an exercise for industrial development.”  Id. 
 206. Tondro, supra note 28, at 799-800.  One way to limit the use of the land is to create 
covenants restricting the use that run with the land.  Id. at 799.  Massachusetts employs a form of 
restrictive covenant known as an “Activity and Use Limitation.”  Id. at 799-800.  However, one of 
the drawbacks to restrictive covenants is that lenders would be reluctant unless the covenant 
contained a clause that absolved the lender of liability if the owner breached the covenant and the 
lender forecloses on the property.  Id. at 800. 
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productive use.207 Opponents of risk-based standards argue that cleanup 
levels should not be compromised.208  They fear that the health of the 
community is at risk, especially in urban neighborhoods where industrial 
uses are co-located with residences.209  Opponents note that zoning laws 
may change, and that covenants with the land will not always relieve the 
risk of future inappropriate uses.210  Additionally, cleanup standards that 
are tied to the end use limit the redevelopment potential of a property.211 
C.  Funding and Financial Incentives 
Most brownfield projects are too costly for private developers to 
undertake without financial assistance of some form.212  The cost of 
audits and assessments alone may be enough to deter a developer from 
considering a brownfield site.213  If a developer does decide to pursue 
redevelopment of a brownfield, a lack of willing lenders may prevent the 
project from coming to fruition.214  The EPA pilot program illustrates 
that a relatively small sum can be expended in order to select candidate 
sites for remediation, conduct initial audits and assessments to determine 
the feasibility of a project, and to formulate a plan based on the input of 
the various stakeholders.215  Funding can be used to alleviate some of the 
                                                          
 207. For instance, in Michigan a site specific cleanup compromise between Chrysler 
Corporation and the state enabled Chrysler to build a plant in a poor section of Detroit, creating 
badly needed jobs.  Solo, supra note 5, at 308.  Chrysler had investigated building a Jeep 
manufacturing plant on a vacant brownfield that was contaminated with “traces of gasoline and 
metals.”  Id.  The company was deterred, however, by the nearly one million dollar cleanup price 
tag that accompanied the property.  Id.  Because returning the land to stringent Federal Superfund 
levels of clean did not comport with the final use of the land, Michigan relaxed the cleanup levels.  
Id.  Because of the flexible cleanup standards, the plant was built providing 3,000 jobs to the city’s 
residents.  Id. 
 208. See Michael B. Gerrard, New York State’s Browfields Programs: More and Less Than 
Meets the Eye, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 18, 21 (1999) (noting that environmental groups oppose 
flexible cleanup provisions). 
 209. Solo, supra note 5, at 309.  This is the underlying concern propelling the environmental 
justice movement.  See supra note 119, and accompanying text. 
 210. Solo, supra note 5, at 309. 
 211. Garson, supra note 30, at 181.  This is a valid concern if the land was vacant when the 
cleanup took place, and later a structure is placed on the site.  If only minimal cleanup was 
undertaken while the land was vacant, the cost to demolish the structure in order to remove 
contamination below it will cost far more than total original cleanup would have cost.  Id. 
 212. Humphrey, supra note 30, at 4. 
 213. For instance, in Cleveland a newspaper company spent $60,000 conducting “its 
environmental assessment, only to find that the costs of cleanup would be prohibitive.”  Solo, supra 
note 5, at 297. 
 214. See supra note 104, and accompanying text. 
 215. See supra pp. 24-26. 
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costs associated with the initial stages of development in order to attract 
private investors.216 
New York passed a bond act in 1996,217 similar to Ohio’s Issue 
One, that allocated 200 million dollars for brownfield remediation within 
the state.218  The Act, known as Title V, provides grants to assist in 
brownfield restoration by reimbursing municipalities219 for cleanup 
expenses, and by providing liability releases once the site is cleaned.220  
Title V is intended to compliment New York’s voluntary cleanup 
program.221 
D.  Community Involvement 
A key ingredient to a successful brownfield initiative that is often 
overlooked is involving those members of the community that will be 
affected.222  A study conducted in 1997 revealed that “non-
environmental factors” were primarily responsible for brownfield 
development failures.223 Citizens, concerned with the quality of their 
environment regardless of the cost, are at odds with developers who are 
                                                          
 216. For instance, the EPA pilot program does not allow its grants to be used for actual 
cleanup; instead the funds are used to conduct assessments, and gather information on the best 
course of action and reuse of the property.  See supra note 140. 
 217. Title V of the New York State Clean Water/Clean Air Bond Act of 1996, N.Y. ENVTL. 
CONSERV. LAW §§ 56-050 - 56-0511 (1996). 
 218. Vogel, supra note 31, at 85. 
 219. Id.  Title V is limited because it only applies to municipally owned sites.  However, one 
property, the Irvington Village Waterfront Park, was jointly owned by a municipality and a private 
owner and therefore was able to benefit from funds under Title V and assistance through the state 
voluntary cleanup program.  Id. at 101.  Such an outcome would suggest that private developers 
could benefit from Title V if they are willing to join forces with a local municipality. 
 220. Releases are not available for responsible parties.  Id. at 98. 
 221. Although both programs share the common goal of brownfield restoration, the two 
programs differ in several respects.  Id. at 86.  Title V has a more rigorous cleanup standard 
requiring property to be cleaned to pristine state Superfund standards.  Id. at 99.  Originally, flexible 
cleanup standards were considered under Title V, but pressure from environmental activists caused 
the legislature to revert to rigid Superfund standards.  Gerrard, supra note 208, at 21.  Title V sites 
are only allow municipalities to participate, but the voluntary cleanup program encourages private 
parties to participate.  Vogel, supra note 31, at 85.  While the voluntary cleanup is an open program, 
Title V projects are chosen based on four criteria.  Id. at 98.  Title V projects are chosen based on 
the site’s: potential economic benefit, economic benefit, “potential use for public recreation,” and 
whether other funding is available for the project.  Id. 
 222. See Editorial, Bonds Offer Potential to Clean, Preserve Ohio, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 
2, 2000, at 10B (listing the issues that should be considered when developing a brownfields 
program). 
 223. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 30.  These non-environmental factors included: “local 
circumstances, market demand for the product, and extraordinary non-environmental costs.”  Id. 
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driven by “market-oriented goals.”224  Developers must be cognizant of, 
and responsive to, community concerns and work with community 
members to successfully achieve the common goal of revitalization.225  
Members of the affected community should be involved in, or at least 
made aware of, brownfield development plans.226 
Community participation can take several different forms, including 
public dialogues and working groups.227  The public dialogue concept 
emerged from the efforts of the National Environmental Justice 
Advisory Council (NEJAC).228  Public dialogue allows developers and 
planners to gather input from the community in order to address the 
citizens’ fears and incorporate citizens’ ideas into the project.229  But 
some argue that public dialogue does not involve the community enough 
to make a difference.230  Working groups allow for more actual 
                                                          
 224. Defining the Brownfield Problem, supra note 14, at 11; Espinosa, supra note 15, at 15. 
 225. Espinosa, supra note 15, at 30.  A brownfield redevelopment project must address the 
needs of the developer, the local community, and the environment in order to be successful.  See 
Humphrey, supra note 43, at 5.  These participants must work together to combine their collective 
goals which may include: increasing the employment opportunities and spurring economic growth 
in the area; strengthening the local tax base; creating a “healthier, safer, more attractive 
neighborhood”; and ensuring a profitable venture for the developer.  Id. 
 226. Hawley, supra note 179, at 1043.  Many states’ programs are lacking in the area of 
community involvement, including Ohio, whose VAP has been criticized for the lack of public 
involvement.  Id.  Eisen, supra note 8, at 972; See also Edwards, Taft to Piggyback, supra note 11, 
at 01A; Lang, supra note 163, at 312. 
 227. Chambers & Meertens, supra note 117, at 189-191. 
 228. Garson, , supra note 30, at 189.  NEJAC was developed to address the environmental 
justice issue.  Espinosa, supra note 15, at 16-18.  The NEJAC, in a collaborative effort with the US 
EPA, sponsored public dialogues in five large U.S. cities to strategize with citizens about the 
brownfields problem and possible solutions.  Id. at 18.  The dialogues were designed to: “(1) 
provide a forum for local citizens to ask questions of federal administrators, (2) air grievances of 
past agency practices, and (3) suggest new policies and encourage responsible and inclusive 
brownfield redevelopment.”  Id. 
 229. Hawley, supra note 179, at 1044.  Community input can increase the chance of a project’s 
success.  The Homan Square Project in Chicago is an example of the success that can be realized by 
listening to the residents.  See Espinosa, supra note 15, at 23.  In Chicago, Illinois, a developer 
intended to situate low to moderate income housing on a former commercial site.  Although housing 
was needed in the area, the residents were concerned that the development was a guise for 
gentrification of the area.  Id. at 24.  The developer met with concerned community members and 
used their input to incorporate commercial and community service elements into the development 
plan.  Id.  The community service elements included: “green areas, a community park, a local bank 
branch, a family healthcare center, an 800 officer police station, a day care center, and job training 
facilities.” Id. at 25. 
 230. Chambers & Meertens, supra note 117, at 191.  (noting that “[t]he mere opportunity to air 
opinions and concerns early in the process does not amount to substantive community 
participation.”).  The NEJAC generated a report from findings at the public dialogue sessions.  
Environmental Justice, Urban Revitalization, and Brownfields: The Search for Authentic Signs of 
Hope, <http:/www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/html-doc/nejachtm.htm> (last visited Nov. 16, 2000).  The 
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involvement of citizens.231  Working groups are comprised of a few 
community leaders who work closely with government officials “to 
represent the community’s interests” in the remediation and 
redevelopment process.232 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
State activism is necessary if brownfield sites are to be transformed 
into productive facilities that bring jobs to blighted areas.233  However, a 
state’s plan for brownfield redevelopment must be carefully tailored in 
order to properly address the myriad complex issues surrounding 
brownfields.  A concerted effort must be made between developers, 
municipal officials, community members, environmentalists, and 
lenders.234  The success of a brownfield project is dependent on the 
cooperation and input of all stakeholders in order to creatively develop a 
solution unique to the property. 
The passage of Issue One will provide Ohio with $200 million to 
spur the reclamation and redevelopment of Ohio’s many brownfield 
sites.  If the EPA’s pilot grants of $200,000 can create a significant 
improvement and spark private investment, then certainly Ohio can do 
much to improve the current brownfield situation with $200 million 
earmarked for that purpose.235  Ohio is in a good position, as it currently 
has in place one of the country’s most thorough voluntary cleanup 
statutes.  However, the Ohio VAP still has room for improvement.  It 
must increase public participation to the point that the EPA is willing to 
issue a Memorandum of Agreement, which will allow the state to assure 
VAP participants that they can be absolved from federal liability as well. 
Instead of indiscriminately handing out the money collected from 
the bond issue, the state should follow the example set by the EPA pilot 
                                                          
report concluded that more meaningful participation can be achieved through citizen advisory 
boards involving community members “from beginning to end,” and by providing open access to 
information throughout all stages of the project.  Id. 
 231. See Chambers & Meertens, supra note 117, at 191. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 34, at 11 (Charles Bartsch et al. eds., 
1991).  States naturally are better equipped than the federal government to remedy their brownfield 
problems.  States are motivated to return brownfields to productive use in order to generate revenue, 
and the states are “in a better position to evaluate their unique environmental situations and to 
encourage cleanup of toxic substances within their borders.”  Lang, supra note 11, at 286. 
 234. See BROWNFILEDS: CLEANING AND REUSING, supra note 18, at 4. 
 235. See supra notes 42-45, and accompanying text (noting the difference that the EPA 
brownfield pilot program grants can make in a community’s brownfield redevelopment effort). 
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program and use a portion of the funds to target and investigate those 
sites requiring immediate attention.  Once potential sites have been 
identified, the state and local governments must encourage development 
in those areas that would benefit most from redevelopment.  If the most 
successful elements of other brownfield plans are studied and 
implemented, Ohio’s brownfield problem could be improved. 
Faith R. Dylewski 
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